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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether an injured party's valid claim under the "hit-and-run" 
clause of Utah's uninsured motorist statute is barred unless there is 
actual contact between the vehicle occupied by the injured party and 
an unidentified vehicle which proximately causes the injury? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 4, 1982 an accident occurred involving a motor 
vehicle insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State 
Farm") and a "hit-and-run" motor vehicle. At the time the accident 
occurred the Appellant, Lisa Marakis ("Marakis"), was a resident of 
Carbon County, Utah. The Respondent, State Farm, was at the time of 
the accident and is at present a foreign corporation registered to do 
business in the state of Utah. State Farm has been licensed by the 
State of Utah to issue policies of insurance for motor vehicles 
pursuant to Utah law. 
Prior to the accident, on or about March 25, 1982, State Farm 
issued a policy of insurance to Marakis' grandparents, Harold J. and 
Mary Fowler. (Record, Affidavit, Mary Fowler) That policy, No. S06 
3676-C25-44, covered a 1976 Datsun—identification number HLS30288408. 
The Fowler's policy covered bodily injury to any of their relatives 
occupying the Datsun provided that the injuries arose out of the 
operation of the vehicle. Pursuant to statutory mandate the policy 
also provided for recovery in the event of ^a "hit-and-run" accident. 
Utah's uninsured motorist statute does not define the term 
1 
"hit-and-run". However, State Farm's insurance policy includes the 
following in its definition of "uninsured motorist:11 
2. a "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle whose owner 
or driver remains unknown arid which strikes: 
a. the insured or 
b. the vehicle the insured is occupying 
and causes bodily injury to the insured. 
Section III—Uninsured Motor Vehicle—Coverage U 
On the fourth day of September in 1982 Marakis was driving home 
from work in the Fowler's Datsun. As she approached a bend in the 
road which curved sharply around a mountain she encountered an older 
model, light colored, automobile which, in attempting to negotiate 
the curve, crossed over to the wrong side of the road and came 
directly toward Marakis, traveling in her lane. To avoid the 
impending head-on collision Marakis was forced to hug the far right 
side of her lane—precariously close to the soft shoulder. As a 
result she began to lose control of the vehicle in the soft dirt. 
Marakis alertly turned to left and accelerated slightly to regain 
control of the vehicle. Unexpectedly, her Datsun shot across to the 
left side of the road and ran into a fence. The other vehicle 
continued on without stopping. 
Marakis suffered bodily injury as a result of the negligent 
operation of the unidentified vehicle and the Datsun she was driving 
was also damaged. As a result of the impact Marakis' collar bone was 
broken and she suffered multiple lacerations. Consequently, it was 
quite some time before she was physically able to free the vehicle 
from its impacted position. Once the damaged vehicle was extricated, 
2 
however, Marakis immediately made her way to a phone booth and 
reported the "hit-and-run" accident to the Utah Highway Patrol. 
Marakis made a claim against State Farm for her special and 
general damages on July 26, 1984, pursuant to the terms of the 
insurance contract. State Farm refused to pay the damages claiming 
that Marakis' vehicle had failed to make contact with the 
unidentified vehicle. According to State Farm, the absence of 
physical contact between the insured vehicle and the unknown vehicle 
precluded any claim under the insurance contract. 
Marakis filed a complaint against State Farm on October 16, 1984 
in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon County. Two months 
later State Farm answered that complaint. Marakis subsequently filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon her own affidavit and that 
of her grandmother, Mary Fowler. Four notices of this motion, as 
well as a copy of the motion itself, were sent to State Farm's 
attorney. No objection or opposition to the motion was filed. 
The Court entered a ruling in favor of Marakis declaring the 
physical contact provision of State Farm's insurance provision "void 
and unenforceable and against public policy." (Record, Ruling on 
Motion for Summary Judgment, April 30, 1985 p.l) The court entered a 
judgment granting Summary Judgment in favor of Marakis on May 14, 
1985. Pursuant to that judgment the plaintiff requested a hearing on 
damages. 
After notices of the hearing were issued, State Farm responded on 
June 1, 1985 by filing a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment. 
A motion opposing such relief was promptly filed by Marakis. State 
Farm claimed that due to an unspecified and undocumented clerical 
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error and the preoccupation of its attorneys with other cases, the 
four notices, as well as the standard correspondances from the court 
and the plaintiff, went unnoticed. 
Surprisingly, the court granted State Farm's motion. State Farm 
then filed its own motion for Summary Judgment premised upon its 
policy provision limiting recovery for "hit-and-run" accidents to 
those instances in which there is physical contact between the 
insured's vehicle and the vehicle operated by an unknown 
"hit-and-run" motorist. 
In a questionable exercise of discretion tne court entirely 
reversed its position. The Summary Judgment granted in behalf of 
Marakis was vacated and Summary Judgment was entered for State Farm. 
The court held that "the unidentified vehicle is not a 'hit-and-run' 
motor vehicle within the meaning of that term as used in Section 
41-12-21.1, Utah Code Annotated, or within the generally accepted 
meaning of the term." (Record, Judgment of July 17, 1985 p.3). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant brings this action before the Supreme Court of Utah 
on Appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by the Seventh Judicial 
District Court of Carbon County. The Appellant opposes the District 
Court's ruling on the physical contact requirement for "hit-and-run" 
accidents claiming it to be an error of law. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
4 
There is a lack of conscensus among state courts concerning the 
physical contact requirement in "hit-and-run" cases. This lack of 
unanimity is due primarily to the fact that the courts are 
interpreting different statutes. Of' those states with statutes which 
mirror Utah's Uninsured Motorist Statute the majority have rejected 
the physical contact requirement as contrary to the purpose of the 
statute. In other states, judicial decisions upholding the physical 
contact requirement on the basis of policies established prior to the 
enactment of uninsured motorist legislation are being rejected by an 
increasing number of courts. This emerging majority of courts choose 
to examine the origin and underlying purpose of uninsured motorist 
legislation rather than the anachronistic policies of prior statutes 
to guide their statutory interpretation. 
Uninsured Motorist Statutes were enacted to close "gaps" in the 
coverage offered by insurance companies—namely the optional nature 
of such coverage and the contractual requirement of vehicular contact 
as a requisite to recovery. The prime concern of such legislation is 
compensation for injuries inflicted by one from whom damages cannot 
be recovered. State Farm's contractual requirement of physical 
contact reopens a gap intended to be closed by the uninsured motorist 
legislation and contravenes the compensatory purpose of the statute. 
The term "hit-and-run" does not imply physical contact. Many 
courts uphold the physical contact requirement on the premise that 
"hit-and-run" is a synonym for physical contact. Such an 
interpretation ignores the contemporary usage of the term and has 
been rejected by a majority of the state courts. 
State Farm's own insurance contract uses "hit-and-run" as a broad 
5 
term which includes both contact and noncontact accidents and 
accidents where the negligent motorist is known or unknown. However, 
the language in State Farm's contract limits coverage to those motor 
vehicle accidents where there is physical contact and the negligent 
drivers identity is unknown. If "hit-and-run" did not have such a 
broad meaning, the limiting language, which is to be construed 
strictly against the drafter, would be superflous. 
The sole justification for the vehicular contact requirement is 
that it provides evidence of the collision and thereby deters 
fraudulent claims. However, the potential cost of such evidence 
coupled with the probability that a collision could be fabricated and 
used to perpetrate a fraud renders such evidence of dubious merit. 
Removing the requirement of physical contact does not remove the 
Plaintiff's burden of proof. There are other more effective means by 
which the plaintiff may substantiate her claim. The plaintiff should 
be allowed to carry the burden of proving the authenticity of her 
claim using competent evidence without her claim being barred by her 
failure to collide with the "hit-and-run" vehicle. 
Utah's criminal "hit-and-run" statute does not require physical 
contact as the standard for determining when one must stop and give 
assistance. It would be inconsistent to read such a requirement into 
the "hit-and-run" clause of the uninsured motorist statute. 
The purpose of the uninsured motorist statue is to require 
insurance carriers to provide coverage for victims who are entitled 
to, but cannot otherwise, collect damages. Contractually requiring 
physical contact as a condition precedent to recovery creates an 
arbitrary barrier to the assertion of valid claims. Any effort to do 
6 
so is therefore void. 
ARGUMENT 
There is no question that an insurance company is liable when an 
insured motorist is injured in a vehicular collision with a negligent 
uninsured motorist who is liable for the damage. Each of the 50 
States statutorily require that insurance carriers include uninsured 
motorist coverage in their automobile liability insurance policies. 
However, state legislatures have been less uniform in assigning 
liability where the legal cause of a noncontact accident is an 
unidentified motorist who has fled the scene. Consequently, there 
has been a lack of conscensus among the courts of various states as 
to whether vehicular contact is a requisite to recovery. 
While some courts have required actual physical contact between 
the vehicle of the insured and the "hit-and-run" vehicle as a means 
of avoiding fraudulent claims, others have negated the physical 
contact requirement on the grounds that it contravenes the 
compensatory purpose of the statute. The latter assert that the 
evidentiary function of the contact requirement is better served by 
other means. To understand these polar legal positions it is 
necessary to go beneath the surface of the judicial decisions and 
examine their legislative roots. 
I. The Lack of Conscensus Among State Courts on the Physical Contact 
Requirement is Attributable to the Difference in Statutes Being 
Interpreted. The Differences Between These Statutes Must be 
Considered in Interpreting Utah's Uninsured Motorist Statute. 
The State Court's lack of unanimity on the "hit-and-run" contact 
requirement stems from differences in the statutes being interpreted. 
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The legislative prescription has not been uniform and several 
different types of Uninsured Motorist Statutes have emerged. 
Statutory definitions of "hit-and-run" and "uninsured motorist" 
differ from state to state and this difference in statutory language 
has resulted in conflicting decisions by the courts of different 
states regarding the contact requirement. 
In Type One statutes, the term "hit-and-run" is included along 
with the term "uninsured motorist" but is not defined. Thirteen 
states, including Utah, fall within this category.1 Type Two 
statutes include the term "uninsured motorist" but exclude the term 
"hit-and-run." Sixteen states have adopted this statutory language.2 
The type of statute adopted by the third group explicitly defines 
the physical contact requirement. Three states in this group 
explicitly renounce any requirment of physical contact while the 
remaining twelve states presently require physical contact as a 
condition precedent to recovery. The fourth, and most progressive, 
category consists of four states which allow the physical contact 
requirement to be waived if competent evidence exists to corroborate 
the claimant's account of the accident.^ The uninsured motorist 
statutes of the two remaining states are unique and not readily 
classifiable however, it is important to note that both of these 
states have rejected the requirement or physical contact as a 
requisite to recovery under the Uninsured Motorist Statute. 
The judicial decisions of jurisdictions with Type One and Type 
Two statutes are relevant to the case at bar. 
Of the thirteen jurisdictions with Type One Statutes (statutes 
like Utah's which employ but do not define the term "hit-and-run") 
8 
nine have ruled on the physical contact requirement. Of those nine, 
7 
six have invalidated the requirement while only three have failed 
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to reject it. Due to the clarity of the statutory language there 
has been greater harmony among the judicial decisions rendered in 
states with Type One statutes than among the decisions of courts 
interpreting other statutes. 
The legislative inclusion of the term "hit-and-run" together with 
the exclusion of any requirement of physical contact gives the court 
interpretive guidance in that it manifests a deliberate attempt to 
close all of the "gaps" in uninsured motorist coverage. Those courts 
which have rejected the vehicular contact requirement have done so on 
the basis of a carefully reasoned review of the underlying purpose of 
the legislation. Conversely, those courts in jurisdictions with Type 
One statutes which have upheld the physical contact requirement have 
q 
done so on the basis of shallow analysis or careless logic. 
Fourteen of the sixteen states with Type Two statutes have ruled 
on the physical contact requirement. The resulting case law 
represents an even split in authority—seven choosing to reject the 
10 
contact requirement with seven clinging to the anachronistic 
11 
policies of earlier statutes. While the courts in Type Two 
jurisdictions which have rejected the vehicular contact requirement 
have looked carefully at the statute's origin and the legislative 
intent to resolve the question of liability, those not rejecting it 
have rested their decisions on a logical framework supported by three 
presumptions. First, that there is no legislative intent supporting 
another construction. Second, that the result of such an 
interpretation does not lead to an absurd result. And third, that 
9 
without definite information as to the unknown motorist's insurance 
status he is presumed to be insured. See Balestrieri v. Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Insurance Company, 112 Ariz. 160, 540 P.2d 126 
(Ariz. 1975).(These presumptions were refuted by the dissent in 
Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 133 Ariz. 
12 
464, 652 P.2d 537 (Ariz. 1982)). 
This logical framework does not withstand close scrutiny. First, 
as is discussed below, the legislative intent undergirding the 
Uninsured Motorist Statute supports an opposite construction than 
that advocated by proponents of the contact requirement. 
Second, such an interpretation does lead to an absurd result. In 
the instant case, had the vehicle fled the scene after colliding with 
Marakis' vehicle, Marakis could recover. However, Marakis' efforts 
to avoid contact with the vehicle would bar recovery in spite of 
competent evidence to substantiate her claim. This interpertation 
forces a driver to risk injury via collision to insure recovery. 
Such an interpretation is absurd. 
Finally, a presumption that a driver who leaves the scene of an 
accident is insured defies common sense. An insured motorist would 
be more likely to stop and identify himself than would an uninsured 
motorist. If a motorist does not stop and identify himself after an 
accident the most logical presumption, absent evidence to the 
contrary, is that the motorist is not insured. 
In the Motion for Summary Judgment granted by the court below, 
the Respondent offered a lengthy list of decisions by state courts 
which had upheld the vehicular contact requirement. However, the 
Respondent did not point out to the court that many of those cases 
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involved statutes explicitly requiring contact between the vehicle of 
an uninsured motorist and that of a "hit-and-run" motorist as a 
condition precedent to recovery. Nor did the respondent acknowledge 
that the majority of state courts interpreting statutes like Utah's 
Uninsured Motorist Statute (Type One statutes) had soundly rejected 
the contact requirement as contrary to the purpose of the statute. 
Indeed, an emerging majority of courts, after reviewing the origins 
of the Uninsured Motorist Legislation have rejected the requirement 
of vehicular contact. 
II. State Farm's Contractual Requirement of Physical Contact 
Contravenes the Policy Which Undergirds Utah's Uninsured Motorist 
Statute. 
A. The Origin and Purpose of Uninsured Motorist Legislation 
The origin of uninsured motorist legislation is not complex. The 
rapid increase in the number of automobiles in America following the 
end of World War II resulted in a dramatic increase in the incidence 
of automobile accidents. "The inadequacy of the then-existing state 
laws, which had attempted to eliminate the problem either by 
encouraging or in some states by requiring motorists to secure 
insurance, became very apparent." A. Widiss, Uninsured and 
Underinsured Motorist Insurance, 3 (2d ed. 1985)[hereinafter cited as 
Widiss]. As legislatures attempted to resolve the inherent 
difficulties of the existing statutes a debate arose as to whether 
control over driving privileges or compensation of victims was the 
proper course to pursue. Widiss at 6-7. 
Initially, the new generation of statutes focused upon inducing 
motorists to obtain insurance and revoking the driving privileges of 
financially irresponsible tortfeasors. Murphy and Netherton, Public 
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Responsibility and the Uninsured Motorist, 47 Georgetown L.J. 700 
(1959). While the debates in the public sector continued, a more 
innovative private sector turned this newly created entrepeneurial 
opportunity to their advantage. In State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company v. Lambert, 285 So.2d 917 (Ala. 1973), the Supreme Court of 
Alabama explained; 
A progressive and an imaginative insurance industry 
moved into this gap and provided, as optional 
coverage, uninsured motorist protection. The 
responsible motorist was now able for a nominally 
increased premium to cover not only his liability 
to others but protect himself from the loss due to 
personal injury incurred through the fault of the 
financially irresponsible. These irresponsible 
motorists fall basically into two categories—the 
known driver and the unknown driver (hit-and-run). 
While the gap was narrowed, it was not fully 
bridged. Two deficiencies yet remained: (1) the 
uninsured motorist coverage was purely contractual 
and thus wholly optional, and (2) by the terms of 
the policy the insured's protection against 
hit-and-run drivers was conditioned on physical 
contact of the vehicles involved. 
Lambert at 919. (emphasis added) 
In the late 1950's state legislatures began closing these "gaps". 
Insurance carriers were required to provide coverage for victims of 
automobile accidents who had valid claims but were unable to collect 
from the offending motorist. The coverage was no longer optional and 
the first gap was undisputably closed. However, in 1973, Alabama's 
Supreme Court had to decide whether the second "gap"—recovery in 
"hit-and-run" situations contingent on physical contact between the 
vehicles involved—had also been closed by the mandatory uninsured 
motorist legislation. Recognizing that the question could not be 
answered "apart from the historical context within which the statute 
12 
was passed/1 Lambert at 918, the court carefully explained its 
decision; 
In light of this historical perspective, and 
working within the traditional fault concept, the 
legislature passed the Uninsured Motorist Statute. 
By requiring each policy to include such coverage— 
absent an express disavowal on the part of the 
insured—the gap represented by the first 
deficiency was further narrowed. It is equally 
clear that the statute in providing "for the 
protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of uninsured motor vehicles" speaks 
directly to the second deficiency—the unknown or 
hit-and-run as well as the known financially 
irresponsible driver. 
To hold that the legislative intent had the 
restrictive effect of speaking only to the first of 
the two above-referred to deficiencies is to 
dispute that the purpose of the statute is to 
protect persons who are injured through the fault 
of other motorists who in turn are not insured and 
cannot make whole the injured party. The design of 
the statute is to protect injured persons who can 
prove that the accident did in fact occur and that 
he was injured as a proximate result of the 
negligence of such other motorist who cannot 
respond in damages for such injuries. 
Lambert at 919. 
After reiterating that .contract provisions which were more 
restrictive than were the statutory provisions were not valid, the 
court answered the physical contact question directly; 
We hold, therefore, that the "physical contact" 
requirement in the "hit-and-run" provision of the 
automobile liability insurance policies here under 
consideration is in derogation of the Alabama 
Uninsured Motorist Statute and is void as against 
public policy. 
Lambert at 920. See also, Montoya v. Dairyland 
Insurance Company, 394 F.Supp. 1337 (Dist.Ct. N.M. 
1975)(the physical contact requirement was in 
derogation of the remedial nature of the statute 
and the legislative intent not to allow the 
creation of a gap in the coverage.) 
13 
In Farmers Insurance Exhange v. McDermott, 527 P.2d 918 
(Colo.App. 1974) , Colorado's Court of Appeals echoed the Alabama 
Court's interpretation of the statutory language and elaborated upon 
its application; 
. • . the key to the application of the uninsured 
motorist statute is the inability of the innocent 
injured party to recover for a loss caused by 
another's negligence, whether that person is known 
or unknown. There can be no doubt as to the 
liability of the errant driver here, had his 
identity been known. While the language of the 
statute focuses on the problems of an uninsured 
motor vehicle, its applicability is not limited to 
those situations in which the identity of the 
negligent party is known. Furthermore, the 
declaration of public policy expresses the 
legislature's prime concern as the need to 
compensate the innocent driver for injuries 
received at the hands of one from whom damages 
cannot be recovered. 
McDermott at 920. (emphasis added). 
By enacting an uninsured motorist statute, Utah, along with the 
other states, declared that its prime concern is the need to 
compensate the victim for injuries inflicted by one from whom damages 
cannot be recovered. Uninsured motorist coverage is no longer solely 
a matter to be contracted between parties. Insurance carriers must 
provide coverage for those injured by tortfeasors from whom they 
13 
cannot recover. 
The question a court must answer before allowing recovery is not 
whether there was contact between the vehicles but rather, as the 
Supreme court of Florida explained; 
. . .the question to be answered is whether the 
offending motorist has insurance available for the 
protection of the injured party, for whose benefit 
the statute was written; . . . Any other 
construction of the statute is unfair and unduly 
restricts the application intended by the 
14 
legislature. 
Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Company, 249 
So.2d 429,430 (Pla. 1971). 
In 1984 Idaho's intermediate appellate court rejected the 
physical contact provision contained in an insurance carrier's 
policy. In Hammon v. Farmers Insurance Group, 692 P.2d 1202 (Idaho 
App. 1984), the court carefully reviewed the opposing views of stat 
courts with statutes similar to their own and chose to follow the 
better reasoned view of the emerging majority; 
We choose to follow the view that uninsured 
motorist statutes were enacted to "expand insurance 
protection to the public who use the streets or 
highways." (Citation Omitted). A contractual 
requirement of physical contact "unjustifiably 
impedes effectuation of the statutory policy of 
protection for insured against damage from the 
negligence of unidentified drivers." (Citation 
Omitted). Therefore, we hold that the physical 
contact requirement in the uninsured motorist 
section of this policy is contrary to I.e. S 
41-2502. Consequently, it is void. The Hammons 
•are entitled to litigate the merits of their claim 
notwithstanding the lack of physical contact with 
the unidentified vehicle. 
Hammon at 1207. See also, DeMello v. First 
Insurance Company of Hawaii, 55 Hawaii at 524, 523 
P.2d at 310 (Hawaii 1974). 
The cases cited above were interpreting Type Two statutes which 
are more vague than is Utah's Type One statute. Courts construing 
Type One Statutes with language that is similar, if not identical, 
the language of the Utah statute agree with the courts cited above 
that the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to compensate 
those who are entitled, but unable, to collect from the tortfeasor. 
In Surrey v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 384 Mass. 171 
424 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. 1981), the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts (a Type One jurisdiction) stated; 
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The aim of the uninsured motorist statute is to minimize 
the catastrophic financial loss for victims of 
automobile accidents caused by the negligence of 
uninsured tortfeasors, (citations omitted). We believe 
it is wholly inconsistent with this broad remedial 
purpose to permit the insurer to evade mandated coverage 
by erecting an artificial, arbitrary barrier. 
Surrey at 238. See, Pin Pin H. Su v. Kemper Insurance 
Companies/ American Motorists Insurance Company, 431 
A.2d 416,419 (R.I. 1981)(If one views the situation in 
light of this statutory purpose, it seems wholly 
inappropriate to allow an insurance company to deny 
coverage on the sole ground of lack of physical 
contact); Biggs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 569 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1977)(it would 
defeat the purpose of the statute to allow insurance 
contracts to require impact before coverage would be 
extended to their insured.); Soule v. Stouyvesant 
Insurance Company, 364 A.2d 416 (N.H. 1976)(Uninsured 
motorist protection is designed to compensate persons 
for losses which would otherwise go uncompensated 
because of the tortfeasor's lack of insurance or unknown 
identity) and Clark v. Regent Insurance Company, 270 
N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 1978)(Purpose of uninsured motorist 
statute is to provide same protection from injury by 
uninsured or unknown motorist as would be available had 
the tortfeasor been known or insured.). 
In jurisdictions with Type One statutes, a clear majority of the 
courts have rejected the physical contact requirement, holding that 
it is in derogation of the very purpose of the statute. Of the 
courts interpreting the more vague Type Two statutes, those who have 
examined the policies which led to the enactment of the statute have 
also rejected the contact requirement. If we eliminate from the 
tally those states which explicitly define the contact requirement, 
the majority of states hold that the physical contact requirement 
contravenes the purpose for which uninsured motorist statutes were 
enacted. 
B. "Hit-and-Run" is not Synonymous With Physical Contact. 
Many courts which uphold the physical contact requirement do so 
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on the premise that the term "hit-and-run" is synonomous with 
physical contact. In Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 
303 N..E.2d 459 (111. App. 1973), (a Type One jurisdiction) Illinois' 
intermediate appellate court failed to reject the physical contact 
requirement because "The use of the words 'hit-and-run vehicle' by 
the legislature seems to indicate a policy having to do with 
'hitting,f which is spelled out as physical impact." Ferega at 461. 
Such a rigid construction implies that the meaning of the phrase 
"hit-and-run" has not expanded or changed since it was first employed 
by baseball players. This construction ignores the evolution of 
usage and the adaptability of language to contemporary circumstances. 
For example, the term "hit-below-the-belt" was coined by boxers 
to designate an illegal blow or hit. The term is now a cliche' 
meaning to take unfair advantage. No hit is required for the term to 
be effective. Evans and Evans, A Dictionary of Contemporary American 
Usage (1957). Similarly, the term "hit-and-run" now characterizes an 
accident which is caused by one who subsequently leaves the scene 
without identifying himself. Its contemporary usage no longer 
requires nor implies that an actual "hit" occur. It is this 
contemporary usage which has been adopted by most courts. 
In Surrey v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 424 N.E.2d 234 
(Mass. 1981), the plaintiff was forced off the road and into a guard 
rail by an automobile coming from the opposite direction. The 
operator or owner of the other car was not identified and there was 
no physical contact between the insured vehicle and the "hit-and-run" 
vehicle. The defendant-insurer urged a strict construction of the 
term "hit-and-run" arguing that it was synonomous with "physical 
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contact". The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected such 
a construction as improper. The court explained; 
The question sub judice, a matter of first 
impression in the Commonwealth, has been considered 
by numerous jurisdictions. Our review of those 
cases indicated that the defendant's position is no 
longer supported by the majority of the courts, nor 
is it sustained by a proper view of the legislative 
intent. 
Surrey at 236. 
The court then adopted the better reasoned view of the emerging 
majority; 
. . . we conclude that physical contact is not part 
of the usual and accepted meaning of the term 
"hit-and-run." 
Surrey at 238. 
Rhode Island's Supreme Court explained that the common meaning of 
"hit-and-run" had changed since its inception and was broader than 
the defendant claimed. The court stated; 
In interpreting the language "hit and run" we 
believe, as did the Supreme Court of Washington, 
that the term is merely a shorthand colloquial 
expression that is designed to describe a motorist 
who has caused, or contributed by his negligence 
to, an accident and flees the scene without being 
identified. Thus, there is no inherent connotation 
that physical contact is an essential part of its 
definition. 
Pin Pin H. Su at 419. See Halseth v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 268 N.W.2d 730 
(Minn. 1978)(The term 'hit-and-run' is synonymous 
with a vehicle involved in an accident causing 
damages where the driver flees from the scene, 
regardless of whether or not physical contact 
between that vehicle and the insured's automobile 
occurs.). See also, DeMello v. First Insurance 
Company of Hawaii, Ltd., 55 Hawaii 519, 523 P.2d 
304 (Hawaii 1974)(Since it is clear that one car 
accidents can be caused by the negligent operation 
of a second "uninsured" vehicle any contractual 
prerequisite of physical contact between 
automobiles undermines the statutory proposes of 
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HRS S 431-448.). 
A "hit-and-run" motor vehicle accident describes an accident 
caused by a motorist who has fled the scene. There is no requirement 
of vehicular contact. To require physical contact re-opens one of 
the "gaps" in coverage that the statute was designed to close. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court best explained the inconsistent consequence 
of inserting the physical contact requirement into the uninsured 
motorist statute; 
Obviously, if an insured could recover damages from 
a known tortfeasor despite the lack of physical 
contact between his and the insured's vehicles, the 
insured's uninsured motorist coverage should apply 
when the tortfeasor is an unknown hit-and-run 
driver. 
Halseth at 733. 
Had Marakis collided with the unidentified vehicle she could 
recover regardless of her ability to identify either the driver or 
the vehicle. If she could identify the vehicle or its driver she 
would be compensated for her injuries even though there was no 
vehicular contact. However, she has fallen into a coverage "gap" 
arbitrarily created by State Farm's insurance contract. Her claim is 
barred by her inability to identify the tortfeasor and her 
unwillingness to collide with the vehicle which caused the accident. 
This was not the intent of the uninsured motorist legislation and 
a proper construction of the term "hit-and-run" would avoid such a 
result. Defining "hit-and-run" as requiring physical contact would 
contravene the very purpose of the statute. 
III. There Are Less Harsh and More Effective Means of Detering Fraud 
than The Physical Contact Requirement 
The sole justification for the physical contact requirement is 
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its alleged evidentiary function. It has been argued that a 
collision provides objective evidence which corroborates the victim's 
account of the accident.•Grace v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
insurance Company, 197 Neb. 118,121, 246 N.W.2d 874,877 (Neb. 1976). 
However, the potential cost of this evidence raises serious doubts 
concerning its merits. 
In Surrey, the defendant-insurer claimed that the physical 
contact requirement served to prevent fraudulent claims by requiring 
tangible proof of collision. The court rejected this argument in 
favor of a more cogent view; 
This argument succumbs to the overriding purpose of 
the legislation. Furthermore, elimination of this 
arbitrary physical contact requirement does not 
diminish the plaintiff's burden to prove that the 
accident actually did occur as she says. We adopt 
the emerging and better reasoned view of the 
claimant's evidentiary burden, . . . . 
Surrey at 238. 
In Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Company, 249 So.2d 429, 430 
(Fla. 1971), the Florida Supreme Court was less tactful than was the 
Massachusetts court. The Florida Court rejected outright the 
validity of the physical contact requirement; 
The argument that the policy requirement of 
physical contact is reasonable is fallacious. The 
only reason for such a requirement is to prove that 
the accident actually did occur as a claimant may 
say it did. This is a question of fact to be 
determined by the jury, or the judge if demand for 
jury trial is not made. If the injured party can 
sustain the burden of proof that an accident did 
occur, he should be entitled to recover, regardless 
of the actuality of physical contact. 
Brown at 430. 
Hawaii's Supreme Court took this argument a step further suggesting 
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that contact requirement could be used to perpetrate fraud; 
We also note the clear possibility of instances in 
which the contractually imposed requirement will 
not fulfill its.justifiable objective of 
eliminating fraudulent claims. A claimant with a 
fraudulent claim can bolster the same, if 
necessary, by damaging his own car to leave 
apparent proof of the requisite "physical impact" 
with a non-existant "unidentifiable vehicle." The 
contractual "physical impact" requirement thus not 
only sweeps too broadly, but also not broadly 
enough to accomplish its only justifiable and 
statutorily permissible purpose, the prevention of 
frauds. 
DeMello v. First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd., 
523 P.2d 304 (Hawaii 1974). 
The physical contact requirement is not a deterent to fraudulent 
claims. A motorist clever enough to contrive a scheme to defraud an 
insurer could easily fabricate the collision and collect on his 
uninsured motorist coverage. But the alert driver who avoids a 
collision because he is more concerned with saving his life than 
preserving his coverage cannot collect under State Farm's statutory 
construction. 
If the plaintiff can prove that there was an accident caused by 
an unindentified vehicle her claim should not be barred by his 
ability to avoid collision. In Biggs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 569 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1977), the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma admitted that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving an 
accident occured but argued that he should be allowed to carry that 
burden. The court stated; 
Admittedly, the burden of proof will be upon the 
insured to show that the accident was in fact 
caused by an unidentified driver, but this 
opportunity cannot be denied just because there was 
no 'impact' with the offending car. 
Biggs at 433. 
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The rejection of the physical contact requirement does not 
relieve the burden of proving the case. The statute only provides 
coverage for those who are "legally entitled to recover". U.C.A. 8 
42-12-21.2 (1953, enacted 1967). There are other evidentiary sources 
which are less harmful than the requirement of vehicular contact and 
more effective in terms of proving or disproving the plaintiff's 
claim. 
In a fact situation similar to the instant case The Supreme Court 
of Rhode Island listed some of the alternative evidentiary sources 
and processess available to both parties; 
We recognize the possibility of fraudulent claims 
but believe that the element of physical contact is 
not of significant relevance in the identification 
and resistance of such claims. The presence or 
absence of impartial witnesses, the credibility of 
the claimant's testimony, the ability of the 
cross-examiner to expose prevarication are all far 
more efficient tools of the adversary process to 
expose fraud in this context. 
Pin Pin H. Su at 419. 
In Clark v. Regent Insurance Company, 270 N.W.2d 26 (1978), the 
plaintiff was forced, as was Marakis, to swerve to avoid a head-on 
collision between her motor vehicle and an unidentified motor 
vehicle. The plaintiff was injured but there was no physical contact 
between the vehicles. 
The defendant argued that not requiring physical contact would 
result in a flood of fraudulent claims. The court responded; 
The contention that the physical contact 
requirement prevents fraudulent claims appears to 
be of dubious merit. We have not found any signs 
of a flood of "phantom vehicle" claims in the 
states rejecting the requirement, nor have the 
legislatures of those states found it necessary to 
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enact a physical contact requirement to their 
uninsured motorist statutes. We perceive no sound 
reason to deprive an injured insured of recompense 
for a valid claim to prevent the "flood of 
fraudulent claims" which has not materialized in 
other states. 
Clark at 30. 
The physical contact requirement has no merit. The requirement 
of physical contact may itself be used to perpetrate fraud rather 
than deter it. There are more reliable evidentiary sources. If a 
plaintiff can prove, to the satisfaction of a judge or jury, that the 
accident occurred as she testifies that it did, she should not have 
to risk serious injury or death before being allowed to assert her 
claim. 
IV. The Uninsured Motorist Provision of the Defendant's Insurance 
Policy Defines "Hit-and-Run" as a Broad Term Which is Not Synonymous 
With Physical Contact. 
State Farm's contract provides coverage for damage done by 
"hit-and-run" motorists. The contract does not provide coverage for 
all "hit-and-run" cases, however, it covers only those accidents 
involving; 
2. a "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle whose owner or driver 
remains unknown and which strikes: 
a. the insured or 
b. the vehicle the insured is occupying 
and causes bodily injury to the insured. 
Section III—Uninsured Motor Vehicle—Coverage U 
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The commonly accepted meaning of the term "hit-and-run" 
encompasses more than a contact accident where the driver remains 
unknown. If the phrase "hit-and-run" does not have a broader meaning 
which includes noncontact accidents, then the limiting language of 
the contract is superflous. The language of the contract itself, 
which is to be construed strictly against the drafter, Hoffman v. 
Life Insurance Company of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983), 
implies that the term "hit-and-run" includes accidents involving both 
known and unknown drivers as well as contact and noncontact 
accidents. State Farm has simply chosen to limit its coverage to a 
smaller group of "hit-and-run" cases than is provided for by 
statute—namely cases where the "hit-and-run" driver is unknown and 
there has been physical contact between the vehicles. 
The purpose of Utah's Uninsured Motorist Statute is to require 
that insurance carriers provide coverage for persons injured by 
motorists from whom they are entitled to recover damages but from 
whom they are unable collect. Whether the insured is unable to 
collect because the tortfeasor is uninsured or unknown is not 
material to the statute's purpose since a driver who leaves the scene 
of an accident and cannot be located is for all practical purposes 
"uninsured." Hammon v. Farmers Insurance Group, 692 P.2d 1202,1206 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1984)(no genuine distinction between the harm caused 
by known or unknown motorist). Any attempt to place contractual 
limitations on this statutory coverage are void. Brown v. United 
Services Automobile Association, 684 P.2d 1195 (Okla. 1984). 
If Marakis could identify the offender whose negligence 
proximately caused her injuries, she could recover. If she had 
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crashed head-on into the "older model, light colored" automobile 
State Farm would pay the claim. However, State Farm's policy 
restricts its uninsured motorist coverage to those cases in which 
contact occurs. Thus the policy affords less coverage than the 
statute provides and is therefore void. 
V. Criminal "Hit-and-Run" Statutes Which Make Leaving The Scene Of An 
Accident A Criminal Offense Do Not Require Physical Contact. 
Statutes have been enacted by the legislatures of a majority of 
the states requiring a person involved in an accident to stop and 
"give certain information, and render aid to those who have been 
injured." 23 A.L.R. 3d 497, 500. "Familiarly known as "hit-and-run" 
statutes, these acts generally make the failure to so perform, when 
the circumstances envisioned by the statutory scheme occur, a felony 
or misdemeanor." 23 A.L.R. 3d 497, 500. 
Utah has such a statute. Section 41-6-29 of the Utah Code 
provides; 
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident 
resulting in injury to or death of any person shall 
immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such 
accident or as close thereto as possible but shall 
then forthwith return to and in every event shall 
remain at the scene of the accident until he has 
fulfilled the requirements of section 41-6-31. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, S 41-6-29(a)(as ammended 
1977). 
Section 41-6-31 specifies the information and aid that must be 
given. Section 41-6-32 makes a similar requirement of "the driver of 
any vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident with 
any vehicle or other property which is unattended which results in 
damage to the other vehicle or property. . . . " 
The Utah legislature did not require that the operator of a motor 
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vehicle make contact with another vehicle before he is required to 
stop and render assistance. The courts of other states have 
similarly ruled that the essence of the offense is not the contact 
between the vehicles. "The gravamen of the offense is failure to 
stop and provide identification ... and to be available to render 
assistance if required." State v. Vela, 656 P.2d 536,537 (Wash. App. 
1983). Accord, People v. Holford, 403 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1965). New 
Hampshire's Supreme Court has held; 
RSA 262-A:67 (Supp.1975), as is the case with 
'hit-and-run' statutes generally, imposes its 
requirements on any motor vehicle operator who is 
'in any manner involved' in an accident, without 
reference to physical contact. 
Soule at 885. 
The court then explained that the defendant-insurer's "attempted 
limitation" by contract of the "statutory coverage to less than that 
required" by the statute was "ineffective" because the phrase 
"hit-and-run" was not intended to require physical contact. Soule at 
885. 
Utah's legislature realized that accidents could be caused by 
motor vehicles which have no physical contact with the other vehicle 
or vehicles involved. The language "which collides with or is 
involved in an accident with" is indicative of this understanding. 
Since the Utah legislature does not require physical contact as the 
standard for determining when one must stop and give assistance, it 
would be inconsistent to read such a requirement into the 
"hit-and-run" clause of the uninsured motorist statute. 
VI. The Limiting Provision of State Farm's Insurance Contract is an 
Artificial and Arbitrary Barrier to Meritorious Claims and is 
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Therefore Void. 
The purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to require 
insurance carriers to provide coverage for the victims who are 
entitled to, but cannot collect, damages. Upholding the physical 
contact requirement is more than an innocuous misconstruction of 
legislative directive. Upholding the contact requirement creates 
arbitrary barrier to the assertion of valid claims. The Supreme 
Court of Hawaii noted; 
For us to enforce insurer's physical impact 
contractual prerequisite would, in effect, amount 
to our propping up of an arbitrary barricade 
erected to eliminate all claims for damages 
resulting from one car accidents. Since it is 
clear that one car accidents can be caused by the 
negligent operation of a second "uninsured" vehicle 
(as here) any contractual prerequisite of physical 
contact between automobiles undermines the 
statutory purposes of HRS S 431-448. 
DeMello at 308. See Surrey at 238. (We believe it 
is wholly inconsistent with this broad remedial 
purpose to permit the insurer to evade mandated 
coverage by erecting an artificial, arbitrary 
barrier.) . 
New Hampshire pursued a similar analysis, noting that other 
legislatures had deliberately inserted a requirement of physical 
contact while New Hampshire's had not; 
The New Hampshire legislature chose not to 
insert a physical contact requirement into RSA 
268:15-a (Supp. 1975) as has been done in some 
other jurisdictions, (citation omitted). Instead 
our statute mandates compulsory coverage to "all 
persons who are legally entitled to recover 
damages" from uninsured motorists and hit-and-run 
drivers. The statute thus extends coverage to all 
accidents caused by uninsured motorists or 
hit-and-run motorists without any requirement of 
physical contact. 
Soule v. Stuyvesant Insurance Company, 364 A.2d 
883, 884 (1976). See also, Pin Pin H. Su at 
419. (We are of the opinion that the policy 
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requirement of physical contact is void as against 
the policy inherent in the uninsured-motorist 
statute.), and Lambert at 920. (We hold, 
therefore, that the "physical contact" requirement 
is in derogation of the Uninsured Motorist Statute 
and is void as against public policy.). 
Utah's uninsured motorist statute, like New Hampshire's statute, 
provides coverage for those legally entitled to recover damages from 
uninsured motorists and hit-and-run motor vehicles. U.C.A. S 
41-12-21.1 (1953, enacted 1967). It should be similarly construed to 
provide the full protection envisioned by its drafters. Had the 
legislature intended to bar the claims of a select group of 
motorists express provisions would have been made for such exclusion. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania summed up the practical effect 
of upholding the contact requirement in Webb v. United States 
Automobile Association, 227 Pa. Super. 508, 323 A.2d 737 (1974). The 
court explained; 
If the legislature intended to "provide 
protection to innocent victims of irresponsible 
drivers," (citation omitted), it could not also 
intend that the motorist faced with the decision 
whether to collide with another vehicle or to avoid 
it should choose to collide or else lose his 
protection. Webb at 743. 
State Farm's insurance provision requiring physical contact bars 
the legimate and evidentially sound claims of an arbitrarily selected 
group of motorists—those who have not collided with the offending 
vehicle. This barrier is artificial as it was not intended by the 
legislature nor is it supported by the statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah's Uninsured Motorist Statute does not require physi-
cal contact as a condition precedent to recovery in a "hit-and-
run" situation. The lower court's grant of a Summary Judgment 
in favor of respondent was an error of law. The judgment of the 
lower court should be reversed and this case should be remanded 
to the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon County where 
the Appellant can present evidence to sustain her burden of proof 
as to the authenticity of her claim. 
DATED this j^ > day of January, 1986. 
WAYp^B. WATSON, P.C. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, 
Wisconsin. See appendix A 
2 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Wyoming See Appendix B 
3 Delaware, Missouri, Virginia. See Appendix C 
The legislatures enacting Type Two statutes either neglected to 
include the term "hit-and-run" or assumed, as many courts have 
held, that the term "uninsured motorist" included all motorists 
from whom injured motorists were unable to collect. 
4 Alaska, California, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia. 
See Appendix C 
5 Georgia, Oregon, Washington, Kansas. See Appendix D 
6 Maryland and New Jersey. See Appendix E 
7 Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and 
South Dakota 
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8 Illinois, Nebraska and Wisconsin 
9 See, Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 303 N.E.2d 459 
(111. App. 1973); Grace v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, 197 Neb. 118, 246 N.W.2d 874 (Neb. 1976) and Hayne v. 
Progressive Northern Insurance Company, 339 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. 1983)o 
10 Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, New Mexico and 
Pennsylvania. 
11 Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana and 
Ohio 
12 See also, Ward v. Consolidated Underwriters, 535 S.W.2d 830 (Ark. 
1976); Rosnick v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 374 A.2d 1076 
(Conn. 1976); Jett v. Doe, 551 S.W.2d 221,223 (Ky. 1977); Tyler v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 290 So.2d 388 
(La.App 1974) and Travelers Indemnity Company v. Reddick, 37 Ohio 
St.2d 119, 308 N.E.2d 454,457 (Ohio 1974). 
13 Unless such coverage is expressely waived by the insured. See 
Utah Code Annotated, 8 42-12-21.1 (1953, enacted 1967). 
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APPENDIX A 
I. STATUTES USING THE PHRASE "HIT AND RUN" WITHOUT DEFINING THE TERM. 
ILLINOIS: 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 73, 755a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because o 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom,. . . 
MAINE: Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24A, S 2902 (Supp. 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles, for bodily 
injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting from the 
ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured, underinsured or 
hit-and-run motor vehicle. 
MASSACHUSETTS: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch 175, 113L (West Supp. 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers and 
hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death resulting therefrom,... 
MINNESOTA: Minn. Stat. Ann. s 65B.49(4) (Supp. 1985). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because o 
injury. 
NEBRASKA: Neb. Rev. Stat. S 60-509.01 (Reissue 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because o 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom; 
NEW HAMPSHIRE: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 264:15 (1982). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or drivers of 
uninsured motor vehicles, and hit-and-run vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom. 
NORTH DAKOTA: N.D. Cent. Code S 26-02-42 (Supp. 1983). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run jnotor vehicles because o 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom. 
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OKLAHOMA: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, 3636 (West Supp. 1984). 
(B) The policy referred to in subsection (A) of this section shall 
provide coverage therein or supplemental thereto for the 
protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled 
to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor 
vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom. 
RHODE ISLAND: R.I. Gen. Laws S 27-7-2.1 (Reenactment 1979). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of 
property damage, bodily injury, sickness or disease, including 
death resulting therefrom, provided that the named insured shall 
have the right to reject such coverage, or that portion thereof 
that applies to property damage. 
SOUTH DAKOTA: S.D.C.L. S 58-11-9 (Supp. 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting 
therefrom. 
UTAH: Utah Code Ann. S 41-12-21.1 (1981). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom. 
VERMONT: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, S 941 (Supp. 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting from 
the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured, underinsured 
or hit-and-run motor vehicle. 
WISCONSIN: Wise. Stat. Ann. S 632.32(4)(a) (West Supp. 1984). 
Uninsured motorist. 
1. For the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled 
to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor 
vehicles motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death resulting therefrom, in the limits of at 
least $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. The insurer may 
increase the coverage limits provided under this paragraph up to 
the bodily injury liability limits provided in the policy. 
2. In this paragraph "uninsured motor vehicle" also includes: 
. . . . 
b. An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run 
accident. 
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APPENDIX B 
UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTES WHICH EXCLUDE THE PHRASE "HIT-AND-RUN" 
ALABAMA: Ala. Code S 32-7-23 (Supp. 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, "including death, resulting therefrom; . . . . 
(b) The term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall include, but is not 
limited to, motor vehicles with respect to which: 
(1) neither the owner nor the operator carries bodily injury 
liability insurance; 
(2) any applicable policy liability limits for bodily injury 
are below the minimum required under section 32-7-6; 
(3) the insurer becomes insolvent after the policy is issued 
so there is no insurance applicable to, or at the time of, the 
accident; and 
(4) the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily 
injury liability bonds and insurance policies available to an 
injured person after an accident is less that the damages which 
the injured person is legally entitled to recover. 
ARIZONA: Ariz. Rev. Stat. S 20-259.01 (Supp. 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom. For the purposes 
of the coverage provided for pursuant to this section, "uninsured 
motorist vehicles", subject to the terms and conditions of such 
coverage, includes any insured motor vehicle if the liability 
v insurer of the vehicle is unable to make payment on the liability 
of its insured, within the limits of the coverage, because of 
insolvency. 
ARKANSAS: Ark. Stat. Ann. SS 66-4003 (Supp. 1983). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom; 
COLORADO: Colo. Rev. Stat. S 10-4-319 (1973). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom; 
CONNECTICUT: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. S 38-175c (Supp. 1985). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles and 
insured motor vehicles, the insurer of which becomes insolvent 
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prior to payment of such damages, because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom; 
FLORIDA: Fla. Stat. Ann. S 627.727 (Supp. 1985). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom. 
HAWAII: Haw. Rev. Stat. S 431-448 (1976). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom, 
IDAHO: Idaho Code SS 41-2502 (1977). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom; 
INDIANA: Ind. Code Ann. S27-7-5-2(a)(2) (Burns Supp. 1984). 
In limits for bodily injury or death set forth in IC 9-2-1-15 
under policy provisions approved by the commissioner of insurance, 
for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally 
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death resulting therefrom. 
KENTUCKY: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 304.20-020 (Baldwin 1981). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom; 
LOUISIANA: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. s 22-1406D(1)(a) (West 1978). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; 
MONTANA: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. s 33-23-201 (1983). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom; 
NEW MEXICO: S66-5-301 (Supp. 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,, sickness or 
disease, including death, and for injury to or destruction of 
property resulting therefrom, according to the rules and 
regulations promulgated by, and under provisions filed with and 
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approved by, the superintendent of insurance. 
OHIO: Ohio Rev, Code Ann. S 3937.18 (Supp. 1984). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who ar 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom; 
PENNSYLVANIA: Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 40-2000 (Purdon 1971). 
. . . [f*]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who ar 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom, 
WYOMING: Wyo. Stat. Ann. s 31-10-101 (1977). 
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who ar 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom. 
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APPENDIX C 
I. UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTES WHICH EXPLICITLY DEFINE THE CONTACT 
REQUIREMENT. 
A. STATE'S WITH STATUTES REQUIRING CONTACT 
ALASKA- Alaska Statutes S 28.20.445(f) (1984). 
If both the owner and operator of the uninsured vehicle are 
unknown, payment under the uninsured and underinsured motorists 
coverage shall be made only where direct physical contact between 
the insured and the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles has 
occurred. A vehicle that has left the scene of the accident with 
an insured vehicle is presumed to be uninsured if the person 
insured reports the accident to the appropriate authorities within 
24 hours. 
CALIFORNIA- Cal. Ins. Code s 11580.2 (b) (West Supp. 1984). 
The term "uninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle ..., [or] 
the owner or operator thereof be unknown, provided that, with 
respect to an "uninsured motor vehicle" whose owner or operator is 
unknown: 
(1) The bodily injury has arisen out of physical contact of 
such automobile with the insured or with an automobile which the 
insured is occupying. 
IOWA- Iowa Code Amu S 516A.1 (Supp. 1984) 
... legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator 
of an uninsured motor vehicle or a hit-and-run motor vehicle or an 
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury, sickness, or 
disease, including death resulting therefrom, caused by accident 
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such 
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle, or arising out of 
physical contact of such hit-and-run motor vehicle with the person 
insured or with a motor vehicle which the person insured is 
occupying at the time of the accident. 
MICHIGAN- Mich. Comp. Laws S 257.1112 (1977). 
Where the death of or personal injury to any person is occasioned 
in this state by a motor vehicle but the identity of the motor 
vehicle and of the driver and owner thereof cannot be established, 
any person who would have a cause of action against the owner or 
driver in respect to the death or personal injury may bring an 
action against the secretary, either alone or as a codefendant 
with others alleged to be responsible for the death or personal 
injury. In any action commenced under this section, physical 
contact by the unidentified vehicle with the plaintiff or with a 
vehicle occupied by the plaintiff, is a condition precedent to 
such action. 
MISSISSIPPI- Miss. Code Ann. S 83-ll-103(c) (Supp. 1984). 
(c) The term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall mean: 
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) A motor vehicle of which the owner or operator is 
unknown; provided that in order for the insured to recover under 
the endorsement where the owner of operator of any motor vehicle 
which causes bodily injury to the insured is unknown, actual 
physical contact must have occurred between the motor vehicle 
owned or operated by such unknown person and the person or 
property of the insured. 
NEVADA- Nev. Rev. Stat. S 690B.020 3.(e) (1957). 
. . . . legally entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of uninsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles. . . . 
3. For the purposes of this section the term "uninsured motor 
vehicle" means a motor vehicle: 
(e) The owner or operator of which is unknown or after reasonable 
diligence cannot be found if: 
(1) The bodily injury or death has resulted from physical 
contact of the automobile with the named insured or the person 
claiming under him or with an automobile which the named insured 
or such a person is occupying; 
Note- this language is the product of a 1979 amendment. 
NEW YORK- N.Y. Ins. Law S 5217 (Mckinney Supp. 1984). 
(A) The protection provided by this article shall not apply to any 
cause of action by an insured or qualified person arising out of a 
motor vehicle accident occurring in this state lying against a 
person or persons whose identity is unascertainable, unless the 
bodily injury to the insured or qualified person arose out of 
physical contact of the motor vehicle causing such bodily injury 
with the insured or qualified person or with a motor vehicle which 
the insured or qualified person was occupying at the time of the 
accident. 
(B) The word "occupying" means in or upon or entering into or 
alighting from. 
NORTH CAROLINA- N.C. Gen. State. S 20-279.19 (b)(3)b. (1983). 
Where the insured, under the uninsured motorist coverage, claims 
that he has sustained bodily injury as the result of a collision 
between motor vehicles and asserts that the identity of the 
operator or owner of a vehicle (other than a vehicle in which the 
insured is a passenger) cannot be ascertained, the insured may 
institute an action directly against the insurer: 
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SOUTH CAROLINA- S.C. Code Ann. S 56-9-850 (1976). 
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily 
injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, there shall 
be no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist 
provision, unless 
• • . • 
(2) The injury or damage was caused by physical contact with the 
unknown vehicle, and 
TENNESSEE- Tenn. Code Ann. S 56-7-1201 (Supp. 1984). 
(e) If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes 
bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, the 
insured shall have no right to recover under the uninsured 
motorist provision unless: 
(1) Actual physical contact shall have occurred between the motor 
vehicle owned or operated by such unknown person and the person or 
property of the insured; 
TEXAS- Tex. Ins. Code Ann. S 5.06-l(2)(d) (1981). 
. . . in order for the insured to recover under the uninsured 
motorist coverages where the owner or operator of any motor 
vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the 
insured is unknown, actual physical contact must have occurred 
between the motor vehicle owned or operated by such unknown person 
and the person or property of the insured. 
WEST VIRGINIA- W.Va. Code S 33-6-31(e) (Supp. 1984). 
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily 
injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, the insured, 
or someone in his behalf in order for the insured to recover under 
the uninsured motorist endorsement or provision, shall: 
(iii) Upon trial establish that the motor vehicle, which caused 
the bodily injury or property damage, whose operator is unknown, 
was a "hit and run" motor vehicle, meaning a motor vehicle which 
causes damage to the property of the insured arising out of 
physical contact of such motor vehicle therewith, or which causes 
bodily injury to the insured arising out of physical contact of 
such motor vehicle with the insured or with a motor vehicle which 
the insured was occupying at the time of the accident. 
B.STATE'S WITH STATUTES EXPLICITLY NEGATING THE CONTACT REQUIREMENT 
DELAWARE- Del. Code Ann. Title 18 S 3902(a)(3) (Supp. 1984). 
For the purpose of this section, an uninsured vehicle shall be 
defined as: 
(c) A hit-and-run motor vehicle that causes an accident 
resulting in bodily injury or property damage to property of the 
insured. Bodily injury or property damage must be caused by 
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physical contact of the hit-and-run vehicle with the insured or 
with an insured motor vehicle, or by a noncontact vehicle where 
the identity of both the driver and the owner of such vehicle are 
unknown. 
Note- Prior to 1982 Del. Code tit. 18 S 18 3902 contained the 
following language: 
...for the protection of persons who are legally entitled to 
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured or 
hit-and-run motor vehicles.... 
In 1982 the section was amended to define "hit-and-run." 
MISSOURI- Mo. Rev. Stat. S 379.203 (Supp. 1984). 
. . . who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. Such 
legal entitlement exists although the identity of the owner or 
operator of the motor vehicle cannot be established because such 
owner or operator and the motor vehicle departed the scene of the 
occurrence occasioning such bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death, before identification. It also exists whether or 
not physical contact was made between the uninsured motor vehicle 
and the insured or the insured's motor vehicle. 
VIRGINIA- Va. Code S 38.1-381(d) (Supp. 1984). 
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily 
injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, and if the 
damage or injury results from an accident where there has been no 
contact between such motor vehicle and the motor vehicle occupied 
by the insured or where there has been no contact with the person 
of the insured if he was not occupying a motor vehicle, then in 
order for the insured to recover under the endorsement, the 
accident shall be reported promptly to either the insurer, the 
Division of Motor Vehicles, on a form prescribed by the Division 
for reporting accidents, or a law-enforcement officer having 
jurisdiction in the county or city in which the accident occurred, 
unless it is impracticable to do so, in which event, such report 
shall be made as soon as reasonably practicable under the 
circumstances. 
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APPENDIX D 
I. STATUTES REQUIRING COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 
PHYSICAL CONTACT REQUIREMENT 
GEORGIA: Ga. Code Ann. s 56-407.1 (Supp. 1984). 
(a)(1) No automobile liability policy or motor vehicle liability 
policy shall be issued or delivered in this state to the owner of 
such vehicle licensed in this state upon any motor vehicle then 
principally garaged or principally used in this state unless it 
contains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the 
insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as 
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, 
(b)(2) A motor vehicle shall be deemed to be uninsured if the 
owner or operator of the motor vehicle is unknown. In those cases 
recovery under the endorsement or provisions shall be subject to 
the conditions set forth in subsections (c) through (j) of this 
Code section and, in order for the insured to recover under the 
endorsement where the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which 
causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, 
actual physical contact must have occurred between the motor 
vehicle owned or operated by the unknown person and the person or 
property of the insured. Such physical contact shall not be 
required if the description by the claimant of how the occurrence 
is corroborated by an eyewitness to the occurrence other than the 
claimant. 
Note- Prior to January 1, 1985 the Georgia legislature required 
physical contact in those cases where owner or operator of the 
offending vehicle was unknown. The above language requiring 
contact only in cases lacking independent competent evidence 
became effective January 1, 1985. 
OREGON- Or. Rev. Stat. S 743.792(2) (1983). 
(f) "Hit-and-run vehicle" means a vehicle which causes bodily 
injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such 
vehicle with the insured or with a vehicle which the insured is 
occupying at the time of the accident, provided: 
(A) There cannot be ascertained the identity of either the 
operator or the owner of such hit-and-run vehicle; 
(g) "Phantom vehicle" means a vehicle which causes bodily injury 
to an insured arising out of a motor vehicle accident which is 
caused by an automobile which has no physical contact with the 
insured or the vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time 
of the accident, provided; 
(A) There cannot be ascertained the identity of either the 
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operator or the owner of such phantom vehicle; 
(B) The facts of such accident can be corroborated by 
competent evidence other than the testimony of the insured or 
any person having an uninsured motorist claim resulting from 
the accident; 
WASHINGTON- Wash. Rev. Code S 48.22.030(2) (1984). 
. . . legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators 
of underinsured motor vehicles, hit-and-run motor vehicles, and 
phantom vehicles. . . 
(8) For the purposes of this chapter, a "phantom vehicle" shall 
mean a motor vehicle which causes bodily injury, death, or 
property damage to an insured and has no physical contact with the 
insured or the vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time 
of the accident if: 
(a) The facts of the accident can be corroborated by 
competent evidence other than the testimony of the insured or 
any person having an underinsured motorist claim resulting 
from the accident; and 
(b) The accident has been reported to the appropriate law 
enforcement agency within seventy-two hours of the accident. 
KANSAS- Kan. Stat. Ann. s 40-284 (Supp. 1984). 
. . . legally entitled to recover as damages from the uninsured 
owner or operator of motor vehicle. . . 
(e) Any insurer may provide for the exclusion of limitation of 
coverage: 
. . . . 
. . . . 
(3) When there is no evidence of physical contact with the 
uninsured motor vehicle and when there is no reliable competent 
evidence to prove the facts of the accident from a disinterested 
witness not making a claim under the policy; 
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APPENDIX E 
I. STATUTES DEFINING "HIT-AND-RUN" OR REQUIRING AS AN ALTERNATIVE THAT 
THE OWNER OR OPERATOR OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE BE "UNIDENTIFIABLE". 
MARYLAND: Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, S 481A (1979). 
Any endorsement or provision protecting the insured against damage 
caused by an uninsured motor vehicle, contained in any policy of 
insurance issued and delivered in this State, shall be deemed to 
cover damage caused by a motor vehicle of which the liability 
insurer is or becomes insolvent or otherwise unable to pay claims, 
in like manner and to like extent as for damage caused by a motor 
vehicle as to which no liability insurance exists. 
Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, S 243H (Supp. 1984). 
(a) Types of claims which may be made against Fund.-
The following types of claims arising after January 1, 1973, may 
be made against the Fund under this section subject to the 
provisions of this subtitle, and to the extent that the claim is 
not covered by a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance: 
(1) Claims for the death of or personal injury to a qualified 
person or for damage to property in excess of $100, arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State 
where the identity of the motor vehicle and of the operator and 
owner thereof cannot be ascertained or it is established that the 
motor vehicle, at the time the accident occurred, was in the 
possession of some person other than the owner without the owner's 
consent and that the identity of the person cannot be ascertained; 
provided that 
(iv) All reasonable efforts have been made to ascertain the 
identity of the motor vehicle and of the owner and operator 
thereof and either the identity of the motor vehicle and the owner 
and operator thereof cannot be established, or the identity of the 
operator who was operating the motor vehicle without the owner's 
consent cannot be established. 
NEW JERSEY: N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 17:28-1.1 (1985). 
For payment of all or part of the sums which the insured or his 
legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as 
damages from the operator or owner of an uninsured motor vehicle, 
or hit and run motor vehicle, as defined in section. . . 
[39:6-78], because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death resulting therefrom, sustained by the insured, 
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of such uninsured or hit and run motor vehicle anywhere 
within the United States or Canada; 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 39:6-78 (Supp. 1985). 
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When the death of, or personal injury to, any person arises out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State 
on or after April 1, 1955, but the identity of the motor vehicle 
and of the operator and the owner thereof cannot be ascertained or 
it is established that the motor vehicle was, at the time said 
accident occurred, in the possession of some person other than the 
owner without the owner's consent and that the identity of such 
person cannot be ascertained, any qualified person who would have 
a cause of action against the operator or owner or both in respect 
to such death or personal injury may bring an action therefor 
against the director in any court of competent jurisdiction, but 
no judgment against the director shall be entered in such action 
unless the court is satisfied, upon the hearing of the action, 
that— 
(e) All reasonable efforts have been made to ascertain the 
identity of the motor vehicle and of the owner and operator 
thereof and either that the identity of the motor vehicle and the 
owner and operator thereof cannot be established, or that the 
identity of the operator who was operating the motor vehicle 
44 
ADDENDUM 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 8 North Unive r s i ty Avenue 
P . 0 . Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA MARAKIS, : 
P l a i n t i f f , : J U D G M E N T 
v s . : 
STATE FARM FIRE AND : 
CASUALTY CO., Civil No. 14,390 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly and duly 
before the Court en the 11th day of July, 1985, pursuant to the 
parties' cross notions for summary judgment. The Court being 
fully advisee in tne premises, and having previously entered 
Findings of Fact, lonclusions of Law, and an Order granting 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, hereby enters judgment 
as follows: 
Defendant is awarded judgment against plaintiff, no 
cause for action. 
45 
DATED AND SIGNED this £ f day of July, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
rD #UNNELL>; district BOY B LL^ t)ist Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Judgment, with postage prepaid thereon this /777~)day o f July, 
1985, to: 
Wayne B. Watson 
Beverley A. Ramsey 
Attorneys at Law 
269t North University Avenue 
Sui-e 220 
Pro^o, Utah 84604 
secretary 
RAY PHILLIPS IVIE 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 8 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 6 72 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA MARAKIS, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAV? 
vs. : 
STATE FARM FIRE AND : 
CASUALTY CO., Civil No. 14,390 
Defendant. 
This matter having come before the Court pursuant to 
plaintiff and defendant's cross motions for summary judgment, 
and the Courz having reviewed the memorandum of legal points 
and authorities, affidavits, and undisputed facts revealed 
through discrery, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises hereby enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds for the purpose of plaintiff's 
and defendant s respective motions for summary judgment that 
plaintiff, Ll3a Marakis, alleges that she was involved in a 
motor vehicle accident on or about September 4, 1982. (Complaint, 
Paragraph 6) 
2. That the motor vehicle accident was alleged by 
plaintiff to have occurred when her vehicle was forced from the 
road by an unidentified vehicle which plaintiff further alleges 
to have left the scene of the accident. (Plaintiff's Affidavit) 
3. That the only person known to plaintiff who 
witnessed the motor vehicle accident is the plaintiff herself* 
(Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories) 
4. That the vehicle driven by plaintiff at the time 
of the accident as alleged by plaintiff, was a 1976 2-door 
Datsun automobile, owned by Harold J. and Mary Fowler. 
(Affidavit of Mary Fowler) 
5. That at the time of the incident as alleged by 
plaintiff, the vehicle was the subject of a policy of insurance 
between the Fowlers and defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company, Policy No. S06-3676-C25-44. That said policy contained 
provisions for uninsured motorist insurance. (Complaint) 
6. That the policy of insurance between the Fowlers 
and defendant provided for payment of damages for bodily injury 
that an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner 
or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. That the policy 
further defined uninsured motor vehicle to mean: 
A "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle whose 
owner or driver remains unknown and which 
strikes: 
a. the insured or 
b. the vehicle the insured is occupying 
and causes bodily injury to the insured. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
does hereby enter the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the 
contract of insurance between defendant and Harold J. and Mary 
Fowler does not require defendant to perform under the contract 
pursuant to the uninsured motorist provision of said contract 
due to the fact that no physical contact between the vehicle 
driven by plaintiff and the unidentified vehicle occurred. 
2. The Court further concludes that the unidentified 
vehicle is not a "hit-and-run" motor vehicle within the meaning 
of that term as used in Section 41-12-21.1, Utah Code 
Annotated, or within the generally accepted meaning of the 
term. 
3. The Court further concludes that defendant is 
entitled to summary judgment against plaintiff. 
DATED AND SIGNED this £<? day of Tulyf 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
• ^ J J U J * 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA MARAKIS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE FARM FIRE AND ] 
CASUALTY CO., 
Defendant. 
I RULING ON MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AND DEFEND-
> ANT'S MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 14390 
In this casef the Court previously granted the 
motion of the Plaintiff for summary judgment finding that 
there was no issue of fact and ruling that the Defendant's 
insurance policy requiring physical contact as to an unin-
sured motorist accident was void and against public policy. 
At the time the motion was granted, the Defendant had not 
filed any objection to the motion or any counter-memoran-
dum of points and authorities or any affidavits. 
Thereafter, for good cause shown the Court all-
owed the Defendant to submit it's counter-memorandum and 
agreed to reconsider the legal ruling as originally made. 
The Court has now considered the legal authori-
ties submitted by the Defendant and has concluded it's ori-
ginal ruling was in error and does hereby set aside the 
previous summary finding that was signed by the Court on 
May 20, 1985. 
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The Defendant has now filed it's Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment contending that there must be physical con-
tact with another vehicle to put the policy into effect 
under the "hit and run1* provisions. 
The Plaintiff in her answers to request for ad-
missions and in her answers to interrogatories and in her 
memorandum of points and authorities, admits that there 
was no physical contact between the vehicle she was dri-
ving and the vehicle that allegedly ran her off the road. 
The Court has considered the cases submitted by both coun-
sel relative to this issue and has concluded that the maj-
ority rule and the better reasoned cases require that physi-
cal contact actually take place. The Court is of the opinion 
that the generally accepted definition of "hit and run" as 
used in Section 41-12-21.1 of the Utah Code and the defini-
tion as found in Section III of the policy which states "A 
hit and run land motor vehicle whose owner or driver remains 
unknown and which strikes the vehicle the insured is occupy-
ing or causes bodily injury to the insured" must be accepted 
to mean that physical contact is required in order to create 
any liability under the policy . 
Therefore, the Court grants the Defendant'-s Motion 
For Summary Judgment under the undisputed facts of this case 
and finds that the >Rlaintiff has no cause of action against 
this Defendant as a matter of law. 
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In view of the Court's ruling, it is not neces-
ary to rule on other motions and issues that are presently 
pending. 
The attorney for the Defendant is ordered to pre-
pare ar formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
Dated this V day of July, 1S85. 
/ J~^r > '• *'Y' 
t BQYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE ; 
'—- / „ / 
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copies of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by depositing 
the same in the United States Mailr postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Wayne B. Watson 
Beverley A. Ramsey 
Attorneys At Law 
2696 North University Avenue 
Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Ray P. Ivie 
Attorney At Law 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Dated tlyLs i f r ^ d a y o f J u l y , 1 9 8 5 . 
LAUREL A. RAMSTETTER>-
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA MARAKIS, ) 
v RULING ON MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, ' SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. . 
STATE FARM FIRE AND ) 
CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Defendant. ) Civl No. 14390 
In this case, the plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and has supported the Motion by affidavits and a memorandum 
of legal points and authorties. The defendant has filed no objection 
or opposition to the Motion within the time allowed by our Rules of 
Practice. 
Based upon the Affidavit submitted by plaintiff, the Court 
finds that there is no disputed issue of material fact in this case 
and has further concluded, based upon an examination of the legal 
authorities submitted by plaintiff, that the provisions in defendantfs 
insurance policy requiring physical contact before the insurance claim 
is viable as to an uninsured motorist accident, is void and unenforceable 
and against public policy. 
THEREFORE, the Court grants partial summary judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendant on the issue of liability, and 
will, upon application, set a hearing date for receipt of evidence to 
establish the amount of plaintiff's damage. 
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The Attorney for the plaintiff is instructed to prepare a 
formal judgment in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this O C- day of April, 1985. 
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p r e p a i d , to t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
Wayne B. Watson, * . C . 
Beverly A. Ramsey 
Attorneys a t Law 
2595 North University Avenue 
Suite 220 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Ray Phillips Ivie 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys at Law 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
3Q7/7 day of Apri l , DATED t h i s du7A a  f r i l , 1985. 
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